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Immanence and Transcendence: History’s Roles in Normative Legal Theory 
 
1. Introduction: The dialogue between legal history and legal theory 
 
Someone seeking to understand the relationship between history and theory in 
contemporary legal scholarship, or to make sense of the dialogue between legal 
historians and legal theorists, would be forgiven a little confusion. On the one hand, a 
growing body of academic work seeks to bring these two disciplines into 
conversation, or at least to reflect on the possibility of doing so. 1  On the other, 
progress, in the form of mutual appreciation, fruitful collaboration or even a deeper 
sense of what distinguishes these two disciplines, seems to have been limited. 
Generally speaking, the dialogue between legal history and legal theory is 
characterized by requests for greater attention to be paid towards history and, 
connectedly, that the spatial and temporal specificity of law and its practices be 
acknowledged. Historically-minded scholars lament the dominance of ‘abstract’, 
‘philosophical’ legal theory and urge its practitioners to take account of their 
findings. 2  By contrast, calls for historically-minded scholars to become more 
theoretically literate are less frequent3 and where they arise they are often presented as 
an aid to interpretation rather than as a challenge to the historian’s method or 
ambition.4 
This pattern is also evident within criminal law scholarship, where 
sophisticated arguments that underscore the importance of bringing socio-historical 
insights to bear on the task of legal theorizing have been made.5  However, in spite of 
these pleas for greater historical sensitivity there have been limited signs of change. 
                                                        
1 See, for example, Maksymilian Del Mar and Michael Lobban, Legal Theory and 
Legal History (vol 4) (Ashgate 2014); Maksymilian Del Mar and Michael Lobban, 
Law in Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected Dialogue (Bloomsbury, 
2016); a special edition of the Virginia Law Review on Jurisprudence and (Its) History 
(2015 101(4)); a special edition of Critical Analysis of Law on New Historical 
Jurisprudence and Historical Analysis of Law (2015 2(1)). On the relationship 
between legal philosophy and social sciences more generally see Kevin Walton, 
‘Legal Philosophy and the Social Sciences: The Potential for Complementarity’ 
(2015) 6(2) Jurisprudence 231. 
2 See, for example, Brian Tamanaha, ‘Necessary and Universal Truths About Law?’ 
Ratio Juris (2017) doi: 10.1111/raju.12155. 
3 At least as regards legal philosophy. There is considerable literature on law and the 
philosophy of time (see Maks Del Mar, ‘Modelling Law Diachronically’ in Del Mar 
and Lobban, Law in History and Theory (n 1)) and there is much literature on the 
philosophy of history that could usefully be considered by legal historians, e.g. María 
Inés Mudrovcic, ‘Time, History and Philosophy of History’ (2014) 8 Journal of the 
Philosophy of History 217; Berber Bevernage, ‘Tales of Pastness and 
Contemporaneity: On the Politics of Time in History and Anthropology’ (2016) 
Rethinking History 1470; Christophe Bouton, ‘The Critical Theory of History: 
Rethinking the Philosophy of History in the Light of Kosselleck’s Work’ (2016) 55 
History and Theory 163-184. 
4 For example, the four chapters on ‘The History of Theory’ in Del Mar and Lobban, 
Law in History and Theory (n 1). 
5 The contributions of Nicola Lacey, Alan Norrie and Lindsay Farmer are key here, as 
is work by Arlie Loughnan. 
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These signs should not be ignored, for they are welcome developments, but they 
seldom flesh out in a meaningful way what it is that history is supposed to do to 
enhance the theoretical picture. For example, in a recently published volume on the 
‘New Philosophy of Criminal Law’, the editors remark that philosophers of criminal 
law are ‘increasingly recognizing that the tools and resources of other disciplines’, 
including history, can be ‘of use’ in considering questions about punishment, criminal 
responsibility, and so on.6  Exactly what it means to be ‘of use’ is left unexplored.  
On top of this, there remains considerable disconnect between some 
historically-minded legal scholars and some legal theorists, as epitomized by the 
articulation by one legal philosopher of what she perceives to be the lessons offered 
by history. Prompted by Lacey’s socio-historical study of criminal responsibility, 
which includes the exhortation that ‘we cannot understand what responsibility is, or 
has been, unless we also ask what is has been “for” at different times and in different 
places’, Ferzan, a renowned criminal law theorist, undertakes to follow this counsel. 
After consulting some academic literature on witch trials and the prosecution of 
animals, she concludes that these examples serve to show where we have gone wrong 
in the past. In contrast to Lacey’s assertion that criminal responsibility is not a 
‘constant through time and space’, Ferzan’s examination of the history of criminal 
responsibility leads her to believe that responsibility is the ‘fixed star’ that ‘shines 
light on the truth of when individuals ought to be punished, and casts shadows when 
our practices have led us astray’.7 
 Despite selecting some extreme examples, Ferzan appears to have attempted 
to follow Lacey’s advice in good faith. So what accounts for the disjoint between their 
two perspectives? Why, in spite of presumably sincere attempts to foster a dialogue, 
do these two eminent scholars appear to be talking past one another, arriving at ‘two 
different histories of criminal responsibility’? 8  One response might be that 
historically-minded and theoretically-minded scholars are simply engaged in different 
enterprises: they work within different parameters, have different measures of success 
and hope to achieve different ends. 9  This being so, they will reach diverging 
conclusions even when there is a common reliance on history. Whilst this response 
might have some explanatory value, in this paper I suggest that it does not provide the 
full picture, particularly insofar as it implies a certain unity within historical and 
theoretical projects that does not exist.10 Furthermore, I argue that in order to attain 
this full picture we must shift our attention from the divide between history and 
                                                        
6  Chad Landers and Zachary Hoskins, ‘Introduction’ in The New Philosophy of 
Criminal Law (Rowman & Littlefield 2016). 
7 Kimberley Kessler Ferzan, ‘Of Weevils and Witches: What Can We Learn From the 
Ghost of Responsibility Past?’ (2015) 101(4) Virginia Law Review 947. 
8 Ibid 956. 
9 Though some scholars challenge the distinction between history and theory (see, for 
example, Paul Kelly, ‘Rescuing Political Theory from the Tyranny of History’ in 
Marc Stears and Jonathan Floyd (eds), Political Philosophy versus History? 
Contextualism and Real Politics in Contemporary Political Thought (CUP 2011)), the 
distinction is commonly presupposed in legal scholarship, possibly because of the 
shift away from historical jurisprudence that occurred in the nineteenth century (see 
Brian Z Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (CUP 2017, ch 1). 
10 The same laxity in discussing theory (see Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘Legal Theory 
and Legal History: Which Legal Theory’ in Del Mar and Lobban, Law in Theory and 
History (n 1)) often applies to discussions of history. 
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theory to a different divide – the divide between immanence and transcendence – 
which lurks within the disagreement between Lacey and Ferzan and indeed between 
legal theory (of some kinds) and legal history (of some kinds) more broadly.  
The terms immanence and transcendence have long, complex histories and, as 
such, are capable of varied interpretation. In the context of this paper, I draw on the 
way these terms are used in ongoing debates over the rise and limitations of secularist 
political theory11 and indeed within post-secular discourse more generally, 12 where 
tensions similar to those that afflict the dialogue between legal theory and legal 
history abound. More specifically, I use the terms to describe two different mindsets. 
The first, the immanent mindset, is marked by a privileging of the here and now. In 
the context of law, this ‘here and now’ includes prevailing legal thought, the various 
institutional and practical dimensions of law, the values embodied within these 
institutions and practices as expressed in their underpinning commitments and 
assumptions, and the values that dominate a particular place and time, i.e. the law’s 
political and social context. The transcendent mindset, on the other hand, is focused 
on the possibility of exceeding (transcending) the here and now.13  Again, in the 
context of law this would entail the possibility of moving beyond prevailing legal 
thought, institutions and practices (including the values embedded within these) and 
political and social conditions. In this sense, the words ‘immanent’ and ‘transcendent’ 
can be understood as relative terms. They help describe the process of transcending, 
or at least trying to transcend, one set of arrangements and values to arrive an 
alternative, preferable set.  
A second meaning of immanence and transcendence relates to how these 
alternative values and arrangements are conceived. Do they transcend time and space? 
If so, does this imply that they exist in a distinct realm of meaning, separated from our 
temporal and physical reality – a realm of ideas or a realm of Divine transcendence, 
for example? Or are they time and place-specific? And are we required to treat them 
as such if we consider them to be part of our temporal and physical reality? In respect 
of these questions, the mainstream tendency since at least the eighteenth century has 
been to hypostasize an ontological split between the immanent world, which we 
occupy, and a transcendent realm that lies beyond it.14 Thus, a commitment to values 
and ideals that transcend space and time has become synonymous with a certain 
disdain for the immanent world and its particular needs and problems. Vice versa, 
attending to the specificities of time and place, including the immanent world’s 
particular needs and problems, has become associated with a degree of skepticism as 
to the very existence of values and ideals that transcend space and time. We can see 
                                                        
11 E.g. Mary-Jane Rubenstein, ‘Thinking otherwise: Secularity and the Liberal Arts’, 
(The Immanent Frame, 3 December 2009) 
<http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/12/03/thinking-otherwise/ > accessed 26 May 2017. 
12 For example, Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press 2007). 
13 Niels Hendriks et al, ‘Anchoring and Transcendence: PD as an “enabler” in Quality 
of Life’ in Proceedings of the 14th Participatory Design Conference: Short Papers, 
Interactive Exhibitions, Workshops - Volume 2 37-40 (2016) doi: 
10.1145/2948076.2948077; Regina Schwartz, ‘Introduction’ in Regina Schwartz (ed), 
Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the Beyond 
(Routledge 2004). 
14 Glenn Hughes, ‘Transcendence and History: The Search for Ultimacy from Ancient 
Societies to Postmodernity’ (University of Missouri Press 2003) 171. 
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this reflected in the familiar is / ought problem, with immanence – the way things are 
– being firmly separated from transcendence – the way things should be.15  
Despite having come under criticism in various circles,16 this divide continues 
to animate discussions in legal theory, both on the side of neo-Kantians who prioritize 
the pursuit of ideal theory, unhindered by social reality17  and those who propose 
empirically-grounded alternatives. 18  My suggestion in this paper is that the two 
divides between immanence and transcendence animate much of the discord that 
exists between legal theorists and historically-minded legal scholars and that they 
stymie the possibility of meaningful dialogue. This is especially true of the relatively 
neglected normative dimension of the dialogue: discussions pertaining to the difficult 
but important tasks of evaluating, critiquing and reforming law.19 When it comes to 
these discussions, the relations between the two meanings of immanence and 
transcendence outlined above become clear. If, as I argue is the case, the normative 
tasks of evaluating, critiquing and reforming law depend on focussing on the 
possibility of transcending the here and now – what I describe as the transcendent 
mindset – then this, I would suggest, entails a commitment to the existence of values 
and ideals that can transcend the specificities of space and time. For example, even if 
a theorist were to consider currently prevailing institutional arrangements, and the 
values they reflect, to be normatively optimal, her conclusion would have to be 
reached within the critical space that is opened up by contemplating the possibility of 
moving past the here and now.  
Without this gap, there is simply no room to assess whether current 
institutional arrangements and values are normatively desirable. It follows that this 
hypothetical theorist’s allegiance cannot be based on the mere fact that these 
arrangements and values currently prevail, for this would be to close off the critical 
space within which normative appraisal occurs. Instead, her allegiance must be based 
on the concurrence between these arrangements and values and some ideal(s) – even 
if these are those that currently prevail – that she holds and considers capable of 
                                                        
15  Daniel W Smith, ‘Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence Two 
Directions in Recent French Thought’ in Ioanna Kuçuradi et al, The Proceedings of 
the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy (vol 11) (Bowling Green State 
University Philosophy 2007) 123-130. 
16 For some attempts to bridge this gap see, for example, the various contributions to 
Regina Schwartz (n 13), in the context of law see, for example, Taekema et al (eds), 
Facts and Norms in Law: Interdisciplinary Reflections on Legal Method (Edward 
Elgar, 2016). 
17 E.g. Tadros, who focuses on the ‘central idea of the institutions of criminal justice’ 
to develop his account of how that idea is best realized (Victor Tadros, Criminal 
Responsibility (OUP 2007) 8).  
18 E.g.  Melissaris, who contrasts ideal theory with the ‘real world’ of ‘fact and belief’ 
and assumes that principles and values that transcend space and time are ‘true 
independently of experience’ (Emmanuel Melissaris, ‘Theories of Crime and 
Punishment’ in Markus D Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminal Law (OUP 2014) 356-357)). 
19 Though there is no categorical divide between normative and other types of legal 
scholarship, it is possible to distinguish normative, or predominantly normative, 
projects from those that are predominantly non-normative (on this point, see Wibren 
van der Burg, ‘The Need for Audacious, Fully Armed Scholars: Concluding 
Reflections’ in Taekema et al (eds) Facts and Norms in Law (n 16)). 
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transcending space and time. Whether these ideals are deduced in an a priori way, as 
is often assumed, or might be garnered from an examination of the world and its 
history is a point I will return to below, where I also consider the certainty with which 
these ideals might be apprehended and advanced. The important point for the time 
being is that normative theorizing, and any fruitful discussions about it, requires a 
focus on the possibility of transcending the here and now, which in turn depends on 
‘buying in’ to the existence of ideals that transcend space and time.  
This is significant because recent, influential work that advocates greater 
historical sensibility within legal theory, including normative legal theory, at least 
implicitly encourages what I describe as an immanent mindset. In doing so, it risks 
closing off contemplation of, and attempts to realize, any order of things that is 
significantly different to that which currently prevails. It does this in two ways that 
reflect the two related meanings of immanence and transcendence set out above. First, 
it highlights the contingency of legal concepts and practices in such a way that tends 
to erode belief in the existence of ideals that transcend space and time. This is a well-
recognized effect of certain types of historical scholarship. Most notably, socio-
historical scholarship, with its acceptance of empirical method as the basis for truth 
and realness and its sensitivity to context, has worked to discredit the possibility of 
speaking of truth that transcends temporal and physical limitations.20 This kind of 
historical scholarship dominates contemporary academic legal discourse, contributing 
to the impression that historically-informed endeavours can be of little or no use in 
normative theorizing.21 
Second, this recent, influential work encourages theorists to take account of 
existing legal institutions and practices in such a way that, without further elaboration, 
threatens to shrink the normative horizon so that it extends only to the particularities 
of here and now. The problem is that by using history in a way that encourages an 
immanent mindset, this type of scholarship effectively blocks the path to full 
normative engagement. In doing so, it hampers the possibility of fruitful dialogue 
with, or meaningful critique of, theorists who are engaged in the full range of 
normative enterprises. Ironically, by posing their challenge to normative theorists in 
these terms, these scholars also potentially undermine the contribution that history, 
including their own style of socio-historical research, might make to normative legal 
theory. 
Failing to attend to the divide between immanence and transcendence has 
negative consequences at a more general level, too. Despite the association between 
historical scholarship and the immanent mindset, the divide between the two mindsets 
I describe does not map on to a neat disciplinary divide between historians and 
theorists. As I illustrate with some examples, these two mindsets arise within, and cut 
across, legal theory and legal history. An awareness of the difference between them 
                                                        
20 Hughes (n 14) 1. On the anti-foundational tendencies of socio-historical scholarship 
see Kunal M Parker, ‘Law In and As History: The Common Law in the American 
Polity, 1790-1900’ (2011) 1 University of California Irvine Law Review 587. 
21 See, for example, ‘the historian cannot determine whether a Liberal Feminist vision 
is better than a Radical Feminist or a Cultural Feminist vision’ (Michael Lobban, 
‘Prospects for Dialogue’ in Del Mar and Lobban, Law in Theory and History (n 1) 
18). See also, ‘the socio has generally been conceived as a problematic that, through 
its modernist commitments, is distinct from and superior to ethical enquiry’ (Alan 
Norrie, ‘Law, Ethics and Socio-History: The Case of Freedom’ in Dermot Feenan 
(ed), Exploring the ‘Socio’ of Socio-Legal Studies (Palgrave MacMillan 2013) 61)). 
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can therefore help identify and explain examples of intra- as well as inter- disciplinary 
disagreement. Importantly, this suggests that paying attention to the specificities of 
time and place need not lead to adopting the immanent mindset. A normative theorist 
might attend to the particular needs and problems of her community without 
collapsing the critical space that is required for full normative evaluation. 
Furthermore, she might retain a belief in ideals that transcend space and time while 
remaining humble about our capacity to know these with certainty. She might also 
remain open to the possibility that these ideals can be discerned through examination 
of the immanent world, rather than being deduced wholly in the abstract. In other 
words, as I illustrate in section 3, she can reject the presumed associations between 
predominantly normative theorizing, ahistoricism, and ideal theory, and between 
predominantly non-normative theorizing, historical sensibility and cautious realism. 
She can instead show how, by adopting an approach to history that allows for the 
transmission of contentful meaning across time, it is possible to adopt a perspective, 
best described as immanent-transcendent, that allows, and encourages, a transcendent 
mindset while avoiding lapsing into transcendentalism.  
The two key arguments of this paper are therefore that a transcendent mindset 
is required in order to engage in or talk meaningfully about normative theorizing and 
that there are different ways one might adopt a transcendent mindset, not all of which 
require neglecting the particularities of time and place or relying on a priori ideals. 
Crucially, however, belief in the possibility of ideals that transcend space and time but 
are not a priori depends on rejecting the notion that the immanent world we occupy is 
divorced from a transcendent realm of meaning and on rejecting the historicist notion 
that meaning cannot (other than perhaps in an extremely minimal sense) carry across 
different contexts. As long as scholars tend to endorse these two dominant positions, 
even implicitly, their arguments and inquiries will remain inclined to collapse into 
radical immanence, prioritizing the here and now to the exclusion of other 
possibilities, or radical transcendence, reifying and prioritizing a realm of pure ideas 
at the expense of attending to problems that arise and neglecting the insights that the 
past might offer. Recognizing this, the lesson this paper holds for scholars of all types 
is that it is essential to be explicit about one’s metaphysical commitments and to 
reflect fully on the implications this holds for one’s argument, both internally and 
with regard to its potency against arguments founded on altogether different 
metaphysical commitments. This, I would suggest, is a necessary stage in any attempt 
to establish a dialogue – constructive or critical – between history and theory and any 
failure to do this negatively affects both the efficacy and credibility of the message 
one seeks to convey.  
 
2. The immanent mindset 
 
Scholars adopting the immanent mindset, be they secularist political theorists or 
socio-historical scholars, ‘entreat[] us to own up to what we all secretly know already: 
there is no transcendence to the temporal flux, no world of Forms outside Plato's cave. 
All we have are the shadows on the wall, and it is our task to arrange ourselves as 
harmoniously as possible in relation to them’.22 To the extent that this perspective 
encourages attending to the temporal and spatial specificities of our lived reality, it is 
a valuable reminder of the folly of pursuing ahistorical universals. Nevertheless, it 
implies that doing justice to the specificities of time and place entails surrendering the 
                                                        
22 Rubenstein, ‘Thinking otherwise’ (n 11). 
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purportedly naïve belief that there is some overarching meaning to the world we 
inhabit and the practices we undertake. According to this perspective, once this lesson 
is learned, the task then becomes how best to order our existence in accordance with 
the way things currently are.  
 Postponing consideration of whether it is possible to reject this entreaty 
without committing to a Platonic metaphysic (or any other perspective that conceives 
of a transcendent realm beyond the immanent world), the important point for present 
purposes is that when it comes to normative theorizing there are compelling reasons 
to resist the immanent mindset. Focussing so intently on what characterizes the here 
and now, and what is practical and feasible within that context, diverts the normative 
theorist’s attention away from contemplating how things might be otherwise. 
Furthermore, foregrounding the vacillations in practices, concepts and values over 
time, and maintaining their incommensurability, makes it difficult for theorists even 
to rely on the longer traditions out of which existing practices and values have 
emerged. The result is that the scope of normative thinking is reduced so that it 
effectively extends only those arrangements and values that currently prevail. In other 
words, by highlighting the particularities of different contexts and denying, or at least 
minimizing, any cross-contextual sense of meaning, the immanent mindset reduces 
the theorists' normative tools to those that are particular to this time and this place.  
 This is problematic because the only form of normative project this way of 
thinking can comfortably accommodate is an immanent critique that assesses 
practices and institutions against the values and commitments they uphold, or purport 
to uphold, or against the values and commitments that are likely to be supported 
within the prevailing social and political climate. On top of its weak critical capacity, 
additional difficulties afflict this form of normative evaluation when it has been 
encouraged by reliance on the kind of history that erodes belief in the possibility of 
ideals that transcend space and time. Once the possibility of these ideals is eroded, the 
normative theorist is deprived of both the stable benchmark and the critical distance 
that are necessary to assess whether current practices and values are normatively 
desirable and worthy of her allegiance. In other words, the normative theorist is led to 
consider prevailing arrangements as prescriptive and simultaneously deprived of the 
capacity to judge their merit.  
Recent debates in political theory have exposed some of the limitations of 
adopting an immanent mindset: the burgeoning field of realist political philosophy 
provides a powerful counterpoint to abstract, neo-Kantian theorizing but struggles to 
move beyond a pessimistic form of critique that reduces normative engagement to 
negotiation within the confines of a particular historical context. In the process, the 
critical distance that is required for full understanding and radical critique is 
drastically reduced. 23 The same dynamics appear to be affecting legal theory, so that 
the main alternative to abstract legal philosophy that has emerged is a cautious and 
hyper-realist form of theorizing that draws on socio-historical method and insights.  
                                                        
23 See Bonnie Honig and Marc Stears ‘The New Realism: From Modus Vivendi to 
Justice’ in Stears and Floyd (eds), Political Philosophy versus History? (n 9), 
discussing the work of Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss. See also Enzo Rossi, 
‘Reality and Imagination in Political Theory and Practice: On Raymond Geuss’s 
Realism’ (2010) 9(4) European Journal of Political Theory 504-512. 
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Two recent, highly influential,24 contributions to the dialogue between history 
and theory help illustrate this claim. Both works, by Lacey and Farmer, use history in 
their respective analyses of criminal responsibility and criminalization, and both 
champion the role of history in the construction of normative legal theory. Each make 
important and compelling criticisms of philosophical theorizing that pays scant 
attention to the way that law and legal practice are institutionalized, and how this has 
changed over time. Both seem, however, to embrace the immanent mindset and 
therefore risk, through their reliance on history, closing off the two senses of 
transcendence outlined above.25 By emphasizing the importance and specificity of 
prevailing institutional arrangements and values they both, by my interpretation, end 
up blocking the path to the full range of normative theorizing and, furthermore, risk 
becoming apologists for practices they might have no desire to support.26 
For his part, Farmer argues that a normative theory of criminalization 
necessarily depends on the role and function that modern (post eighteenth-century) 
criminal law has acquired through its institutional deployment and according to its 
own self-understanding. 27  The nature of this dependence is not clear, but the 
conception of criminal law that Farmer ascribes to modernity, which is aimed at 
securing civil order, is said to ‘frame[] understandings of what is permissible and 
indeed what is possible’ and establish a ‘normative horizon for thinking critically 
about the criminal law’.28 In addition, this conception of civil order is said to ‘shape 
and constrain the way that certain ends can be brought about’.29 By my reading, this is 
to suggest that what is feasible according to prevailing legal practice and thought – its 
specific conception of civil order – should determine the limits of what is proposed, 
normatively. This interpretation is supported by Farmer’s clarification that, according 
to his argument, ‘actual systems of law act as a constraint on normative 
justifications’.30 It is not only that existing arrangements and commitments affect the 
                                                        
24 In addition to having been extensively reviewed, each work has been the subject of 
special edition book forums in Critical Analysis of Law.   
25 In respect of Lacey’s work, Postema believes that it subordinates philosophy to 
historical, social-legal inquiry (Gerald J Postema, ‘The Sociable Science’ (2015) 
11(5) Virginia Law Review 869-901 at 890). 
26 Lacey’s work highlights the contingency and incommensurability of concepts, such 
as responsibility, and values, such as legality and the rule of law, across time (Nicola 
Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions (OUP 
2016) 197-198; Nicola Lacey, ‘HLA Hart’s Rule of Law: The Limits of Philosophy in 
Historical Perspective’ (2007) 36 Quaderni Fiorentini 1203). Farmer wants to hold on 
to the distinctions between different moments across the liberal tradition, and the 
debates and theories these have generated (Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern 
Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (OUP 2016) 3) and encourages 
awareness of the contingency of particular values (Lindsay Farmer, ‘Making the 
Modern Criminal Law: A Response’ (2017) 4(1) Critical Analysis of Law 53 at 54). 
27  Lindsay Farmer, ‘Criminal Law as an Institution’ in Duff et al (eds), 
Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (OUP 2014) 83 and 
Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law (n 26) ch 1. 
28 Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law (n 26) 302. 
29 Farmer, ‘Criminal Law as an Institution’ (n 27) 90. 
30 Farmer, ‘Making the Modern Criminal Law: A Response’ (n 22) 54. 
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realization of normative theories; they constrain the justifications of these theories 
too. 
A similar message is offered by Lacey. On one hand, Lacey maintains that 
changes in the law, and an explanation their causes, can be ignored by normative 
theorists on the basis that this historical awareness has no bearing on their theories’ 
normative credentials.31 On the other, she argues that ‘it is obvious that the normative 
recommendations of particular principles...are to some degree founded in social 
facts...and vary in their strength with these founding conditions’.32 This suggests that, 
in Lacey’s view, contemporary ‘social facts’ set the parameters of normative 
theorizing. This interpretation is supported by the importance that the feasibility of 
normative principles – the likelihood that they might be realized in the world as it 
stands – holds in Lacey’s account. According to Lacey, theorists ‘must engage’ with 
the fact that the ‘context of interests and institutions…shapes the social practices’ and 
reflect on the implications this context therefore holds ‘for the feasibility of our 
normative vision of criminal law’. Even theorists who are not reform-oriented must 
‘surely, be concerned with the conditions under which those [their] principles and 
values will be most likely to survive’.33  
What it means to be concerned with these conditions is not fully spelled out 
and it is here that the liability to fall into the immanent mindset becomes clear.  In 
respect of reform efforts, there is surely a need to consider the institutional and social 
viability of normative ideals, but if efficacy becomes the overriding concern there is a 
danger that large scale change, which might be possible, even if not feasible, 
disappears from view. Too much focus on efficacy also has a stifling effect on the 
ideals that necessarily underpin reform efforts. If these ideals must be those that are 
likely to be accepted, according to prevailing legal, political and social practices and 
values, then there is little to no critical space within which to evaluate whether they 
are the most normatively desirable. 34  Furthermore, there is no reason why the 
aspirational (utopian) and regulative (critical and evaluative) dimensions of normative 
thinking must be constrained by feasibility. 35  Given that utopian, evaluative and 
reform-oriented thinking are all vital aspects of normative theorizing, suggesting that 
theorists confine their efforts to truncated versions of critique and reform is to avoid 
engaging with the full scope of normative theorizing. The normative imagination is 
simultaneously considerably reduced.36 
                                                        
31 Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility (n 26) 186. 
32 Ibid 178. 
33 Ibid 185. 
34 Weber notes a difficulty with constructivist approaches to international relations 
(Martin Weber, ‘Between ‘isses’ and ‘oughts’: IR constructivism, Critical Theory, 
and the challenge of Political philosophy’ (2014) 20(2) European Journal of 
International Relations 516).  
35 On this point, see the discussion of ‘hypological oughts’ in Nicholas Southwood, 
‘Does “Ought” Imply Feasible?’ (2016) 441(1) Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 at 28-
44. 
36 It is worth noting that in earlier work Lacey endorsed the full range of normative 
theorizing, including critique, utopianism and reformism (see Nicola Lacey, 
‘Normative Reconstruction in Socio-Legal Theory’ (1996) 5(2) Social and Legal 
Studies 131 at 134 and Nicola Lacey, ‘Closure and Critique in Feminist 
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These consequences are ironic for at least two reasons. First, close attention to 
the historical practice of normative theorizing reveals that utopian thinking and the 
desire (and occasionally the ability) to transcend given social, legal and political 
arrangements are long-standing features of the human condition.37 Thus, historically-
minded scholars would surely advocate attending to these dimensions of normative 
theorizing. Second, it is not clear that either Lacey or Farmer want to advocate such a 
close association between normative theorizing and prevailing legal and political 
values and institutions. Farmer sees his contribution to normative theorizing as 
augmenting the range of critical resources that might feed in to a public conversation 
of the kind of law we wish to have38 and Lacey is clear that the methodology she 
employs is not meant to undermine the importance of normative or evaluative 
projects.39  Yet both accounts assign existing practices and commitments a quasi-
prescriptive role in a way that seems to reduce the normative resources available and 
run counter to their dismissal of progressive conceptions of history. 40  This 
undergirding of contemporary arrangements also jars somewhat with Lacey’s 
criticism of recent responses to serious crime and terrorism.41  
The fact that these recent developments are at least partly the product of 
democratic politics42 underscores the inability of adherence to this form of political 
process43 or to procedural norms of lawmaking – benchmarks that some critics of 
abstract moral theorizing, including Farmer,44 posit as providing alternative normative 
                                                                                                                                                              
Jurisprudence: Transcending the Dichotomy or a Foot in Both Camps?’ in Alan 
Norrie (ed), Closure or Critique: New Directions in Legal Theory (Edinburgh 
University Press 1993) 209). It seems possible that Lacey’s turn to socio-history 
might have encouraged this shift. 
37 See Robert A Davis, ‘Education, Utopia and the Limits of Enlightenment’ (2003) 
1(3) Policy Futures in Education 565; Jolyon Agar, Post-Secularism, Realism and 
Utopia: Transcendence and Immanence from Hegel to Bloch (Routledge 2014). 
38 Farmer, ‘Making the Modern Criminal Law: A Response’ (n 26) 60. 
39 Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility (n 26) 191. 
40 E.g. Farmer, ‘Criminal Law as an Institution’ (n 26) 93 and Making the Modern 
Criminal Law (n 26) 116; Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility (n 26) 8. 
Farmer rejects a narrative of decline while warning against assuming the inherent 
superiority of our own understandings (Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law (n 
26) 113; 224-227). 
41  Lacey describes these as ‘reminiscent of the extreme form of character 
responsibility…we might have hoped to have been laid to rest along with the ancien 
régime’ (Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility (n 26) 204). 
42 For example, recent legislation criminalizing conduct associated with terrorism was 
‘enacted in the wake of public anxiety about global terrorism’ (Lacey, In Search of 
Criminal Responsibility (n 26) 152). More generally, the ability of political dialogue 
to be skewed is a recognized danger of political constructivism (Melissaris, ‘Theories 
of Crime and Punishment’ (n 18) 364-365).  
43  For an historical account of liberal neutrality and civic order that explicitly 
champions these features of modernity and shows that they do not entail commitment 
to democracy see Ian Hunter, ‘Is Metaphysics a Threat to Liberal Democracy? On 
Richard Rorty’s “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”’ (2000) 95 Theoria: A 
Journal of Social and Political Theory 59. 
44 Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law (n 26) 303.  
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justification for the law – to provide much in the way of substantive evaluation. Of 
course, those who believe that political values constitute the law’s most appropriate 
normative foundations might eschew substantive evaluation of the law altogether. 
According to this view, so long as the process for deciding what the law constitutes is 
fair, ‘according to an appropriately political conception of fairness’, the law is 
normatively justified.45 Even if we ignore the fact that much normative theory is 
concerned with developing arguments that pertain to law’s substance, however, it is 
important to remember that these substantive arguments constitute part of the 
necessary fodder for the democratic decision-making process.  
With the aim of giving voice to a plurality of views, democratic decision-
making is surely enhanced by suggestions for how to transcend given practices and 
commitments: an immanent mindset that works to discourage these is therefore 
antithetical to the process. 46  Furthermore, inescapable questions about how to 
evaluate and improve the political process itself reintroduce the same issues and 
concerns that are implicated in respect of critiquing and improving the substantive 
law, i.e. how to keep open the possibility of evaluating and altering current 
arrangements in accordance with ideals that transcend place and time. As such, even 
advocates of political constructivism (the idea that law should be grounded in the 
terms on which citizens of a political community regard themselves as members of 
that community) accept that the ‘the outer framework of the institutional [political] 
structure’ is to be determined philosophically (i.e. independently of the empirical 
context) 47  and the political principles advanced by a theorist will be those she 
favours,48 rather than those that prevail. For reasons I explain in the following section, 
it is not necessary to conclude that this outer framework must be determined 
independently of empirical context but these observations highlight how, at the level 
of political institutions, procedural stipulations and other blanket commitments, such 
as human rights and equality, the immanent mindset is equally damaging. 49 
 These points illustrate how relying on history in a way that encourages an 
immanent mindset is liable to result in the (perhaps unintended) undermining of 
normative theorizing that aspires to engage in full critical evaluation. That this should 
occur seems to be attributable to an elision of the processes of understanding 
concepts, practices and values and committing to them. In other words, the insight that 
attention to context or some more encompassing analogue, such as social imaginary 
or lifeworld, is central to fully comprehending concepts, practices and values is easily 
                                                        
45 Vincent Chiao, ‘Making Modern Criminal Law Theory: Reflections on Farmer’ 
(2017) 4(1) Critical Analysis of Law 1 at 7. Farmer also believes that it is not for the 
theorist to provide a prescriptive account of what the law should be (Farmer, ‘Making 
the Modern Criminal Law: A Response’ (n 26) 60).  
46 On how similar notions of spatialization and temporalization serve to undermine 
the pluralism Williams champions, see Honig and Stears ‘The New Realism’ (n 23). 
47 Melissaris, ‘Theories of Crime and Punishment’ (n 18) 363. 
48 As Chiao points out, Hart argued that criminal responsibility should be grounded in 
political, rather than moral, principles: ‘in his case, liberty as the ability to plan one’s 
affairs’ (Chiao, ‘Making Modern Criminal Law Theory’ (n 45) 7 (emphasis added)). 
49 Cf theorists who argue for the universality of these values e.g. Neil MacCormick, 
Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (OUP 2007) 273 and Daniel Chernilo, 
‘Jürgen Habermas: Modern Social Theory as Postmetaphysical Natural Law’ (2013) 
Journal of Classical Sociology 254. 
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transposed into the altogether different assertion that context is central to committing 
to such concepts, practices and values. But this latter assertion is unwarranted. As 
Fasolt has argued, normative judgments about law and justice are made within a 
particular political community that is underpinned by certain shared perceptions and 
criteria. But what one says within that particular political community need not 
demonstrate one’s commitment to it: one’s commitment may be to ‘some other 
political community. It need not even be an actually existing political community. It 
may be a future political community existing ‘nowhere besides our imagination’. 
What this means is that when it comes to expressing commitments to values and 
practices, which is central to much normative theorizing, we need not consider 
ourselves bound within ‘hermetically sealed communities’. 50  We should remain 
capable of committing to, and advocating, a truly different order of things. Of course, 
the political community one inhabits may reject one’s commitments but, as noted 
above, accordance with prevailing sensibilities is not a requirement of full normative 
theorizing.  
These reflections on the differences between understanding and commitment 
underscore the points made above about both senses of transcendence. Even if a 
normative theorist must pay attention to the specificities of her particular time and 
place in order to fully understand the nature of the practices and values she undertakes 
to evaluate, critique or reform, she must be focussed on the possibility of transcending 
them, both in terms of their potential alteration and, connectedly, in terms of 
committing to values and practices that transcend time and place. Even if she finds no 
fault within existing arrangements, this conclusion (however unlikely) must be based 
on their concurrence with the ideals she favours: ideals that can cut across space and 
time. The source of these ideals, and the certainty with which she asserts them, will 
vary depending on how they are conceived but they must exist, and they must be 
deployed in the critical space that is opened up when one's focus extends beyond the 
arrangements that currently prevail, i.e. when one embraces a transcendent mindset. 
 
3. The transcendent mindset 
 
The insistence that it is essential to embrace a transcendent mindset must take account 
of two familiar and longstanding concerns with the belief in ideals that transcend 
space and time. First, that when these ideals are considered to be part of some other 
realm of meaning, entirely separated from the world and experience, they induce 
disinterest in the immanent world and its problems.51 Second, that when these ideals 
are considered knowable with absolute certainty they will be asserted as such, thereby 
raising the spectre of tyranny and discouraging the quest for any subsequently 
different order of things.52 In other words, the worry is that believing in, and pursuing, 
ideals that transcend space and time leads to absolutism and myopia – myopia as to 
                                                        
50 Constantin Fasolt, ‘History, Law, and Justice: Empirical Method and Conceptual 
Confusion in the History of Law’ (2015) 5 UC Irvine Law Review 413 at 456-457. 
51  Charles Capper, ‘“A Little Beyond”: The Problem of the Transcendentalist 
Movement in American History’ (1998) 85(2) The Journal of American History 502; 
Hughes (n 14) 144. 
52 Rubenstein, ‘Thinking otherwise’ (n 11); Adam Kotsko, ‘“That They Might Have 
Ontology”: Radical Orthodoxy and the New Debate’ (2009) 10(1) Political Theology 
115. 
  13 
the very real concerns of the world we inhabit and myopia as to the fact that the 
search for ideals is a process that does not necessarily have a clearly fixed end point.  
 There is no reason to suppose, however, that these are necessary corollaries of 
belief in such ideals. Nor is there any reason to suppose that reliance on history, 
which fosters an awareness of contingency and context, must work to erode belief in 
the existence of such ideals. To avoid these conclusions, however, it is necessary first 
to reject the notion that transcendent meaning and the immanent world are absolutely 
separate and, following this, to make use of history in alternative way. These 
alternative ways of using history must open up the critical space within which it is 
possible to evaluate existing legal and political practices and values and must be 
capable of supporting the search for the transcendent ideals that are needed to 
reimagine and robustly critique these practices and values. The question, then, is how 
might these alternative ways of using history be conceived.  
 One option is to follow a Derridean model that aims to navigate a path 
between ‘Platonism (and its related idealist and intellectualist variations) and 
conventionalism (and its related empiricist and historicist variations)’.53 The aim here 
would therefore be to avoid relying on Derrida in the way that the majority of legal 
scholars, particularly critical legal scholars, have to date, i.e. to highlight the political 
issues of law’s violence and absence of justice, and to concentrate instead on how his 
work might be used constructively in contemplating the foundations of law’s 
authority and the possibility of justice.54 Relied on in this way, Derrida offers a means 
of conceiving of an ideal – justice – that avoids collapsing into either the Platonic 
assertion that justice exists utterly independently of historic convention, that can be 
known through rational cognition alone and expressed with certainty, or the 
conventionalist assertion that justice amounts to nothing more than arbitrary 
convention. Instead, justice is considered to be present in what we do and in existing 
(past and present) laws. However, in experiencing the inadequacy of law we 
necessarily appeal to some other, more adequate law.55  
 We must therefore believe in the existence of this ideal of justice even if we 
cannot necessarily verbalize it clearly or know it with absolute certainty. According to 
this view, the decision to commit to a vision of justice is ultimately something of a 
leap in the dark. 56  As Rubenstein argues through her consideration of Derrida’s 
discussion of hospitality, regulative ideals – the pure, unconditional sense of the 
concepts under consideration e.g. hospitality or justice – are necessary to evaluate, 
reimagine and even expound our imperfect attempts to accord with them. But these 
pure, unconditional ideals can only be known through our flawed efforts to attain 
them throughout the course of human history. Once grasped, however imperfectly, 
they are to be deployed in the service of striving to improve (again, imperfectly) 
                                                        
53 Simon Glendinning, ‘Derrida and the Philosophy of Law and Justice’ (2016) Law 
and Critique 187 at 191. On the mutual dependence of the socio-historical and meta-
ethical in Derrida’s critical approach see Chris Lloyd, ‘Derrida’s Law: The Socio-
Historical and the Meta-Ethical; La and Le Politique’ (2017) 26(2) Social & Legal 
Studies 208. 
54 Glendinning, ‘Derrida and the Philosophy of Law and Justice’ (n 53). 
55 Ibid 197. 
56 Ibid 196-200. 
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existing practices and institutions in the world.57  In these respects, the changing 
course of history is absolutely key to normative theorizing but its significance 
depends on belief in the existence of ideals that can transcend the particularities of 
space and time and on commitment to the notion that they can be known through 
specific efforts to instantiate them. Conceived of this way, existing legal systems 
operate less to constrain normative theorizing than as a guide – and nothing more to 
that – to an ideal that exceeds them. 
 These two commitments resonate with Benjamin’s notion of the dialectic 
image – a way of bringing ‘then’ and ‘now’ together in order to interrupt the present58 
that has recently been proffered as offering a way to escape the potentially stultifying 
effects of socio-historical research and invoke the power of history to provide 
opportunities for change.59 The sense of time at work in the dialectical image is 
Messianic and so must be interpreted in light of Benjamin’s understanding of this 
concept.60 Scholarly interpretation of Benjamin’s work suggests that the Messianic, 
understood in different works as ‘the history of the oppressed’ and ‘the eternal’, 
discloses itself in history. This disclosure does not occur through a gradual process of 
revelation, however. Rather, the eternal breaks through, or traverses, the transient 
without ever being contained by it. In other words, the eternal is a feature of 
immanence but not reducible to it.61 As with Derrida’s justice, Benjamin’s Messianic 
offers a possibility for redemption that is manifest in the world but not as clearly 
defined ideals that can be known with certainty. It is evident when transience, the 
demise of things, is combined with happiness – a state of life that resembles the 
Aristotelian eudaimonia. 62  This is what makes Benjamin’s conception of history 
suited to supporting the full range of normative theorizing: it is concerned with the 
passing from one place to another and provides a grounding on which to conceive of 
ethical progress without turning its back on empirical history. Indeed the opposite is 
true: Benjamin’s Messianic provides a metaphysics of experience.63  
 An even earlier, though just as topical, example is Smith.64 Central to Smith’s 
jurisprudential thought is the notion of natural justice, which is distinct from, and 
considered the proper basis of, positive laws. According to Smith’s theory of natural 
justice, its principles are those of the impartial spectator, as discerned through 
spectatorial sympathy with others and consultation of previous attempts to approach 
the standpoint of the impartial spectator, including within laws. Importantly, the 
                                                        
57  Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the 
Opening of Awe (Columbia University Press 2011) 142-144. 
58 See Max Pensky, ‘Method and Time: Benjamin’s Dialectical Images’ in David S 
Ferris (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin (CUP 2004). 
59 E.g. Chris Tomlins, ‘After Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale, Structure’ (2012) 8 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 31. 
60 On some alternatives to linear time that connect the present with a deeper, more 
stable sense of meaning see Hughes (n 14) chs 3 and 4. 
61 Judith Butler, ‘One Time Traverses Another’ in Colby Dickinson and Stéphane 
Symons (eds), Walter Benjamin and Theology (Fordham University Press 2016). 
62 Annika Tiem, ‘Benjamin’s Metaphysics of Transience’ in Dickinson and Symons 
(n 61). 
63 Ibid. 
64 For one indication of the revival of interest in Smith see a special edition of the 
Journal of Scottish Philosophy ‘Adam Smith: Context and Relevance’ (2017) 15(1). 
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naturalness of natural justice means that it is in some sense universal and 
impermeable to social change.65 This allows it to operate as a standard with which to 
evaluate legal practices and systems. 66  Despite his awareness of diachronic 
fluctuations within law and society,67 Smith therefore retained space for the sense of 
justice capable of transcending space and time that was necessary to support his 
critical project.  
 The question of whether and how Smith’s account of natural justice can avoid 
collapsing into mere conventionalism has led to disagreement between Smith 
scholars. If the process of attaining the viewpoint of the impartial spectator – 
spectatorial sympathy – involves concurrence between the sentiments of members of 
a community, how is it possible to identify instances of communal morality going 
awry? This is something Smith’s theory had to accommodate if it was to succeed in 
avoiding the relativism threatened by Hume’s theory of justice – a directing ideal, 
consisting of little more than a few universal test-principles, which necessarily refer to 
the existing value system of a society68 – while attending to historical change and 
contingency in a way that later philosophers who relied on his work did not.69 The 
answer appears to be that, according to Smith, insight into real propriety, where this 
differs from the generally prevailing norms of a community (and, to be clear, in 
Smith’s view this would seldom be the case), could be attained through wisdom and 
virtue. Such wisdom and virtue is achieved through self-command, extensive 
knowledge and adopting a point of view that encompasses all of humankind, rather 
than a particular community. 70  Again, as with Derrida and Benjamin, Smith 
considered it impossible to achieve absolute certainty with regard to this kind of 
evaluation, and he afforded historical and experiential knowledge a central role in the 
search for natural justice. 71 Natural justice is therefore neither ahistorical nor a priori. 
Similarly, Smith had no expectation that his ideal theory of law would become reality 
– piecemeal progress towards building the principles of natural justice into 
                                                        
65 Smith did not use the term ‘natural’ to denote a state of nature, nor did he use it in 
the same way as traditional natural lawyers – he used it to refer to the tendency of 
humankind to generate rights, which formed the core of justice, independently of 
government (Knud Haakonssen, ‘The Lectures on Jurisprudence’ in Ryan Patrick 
Hanley (ed), Adam Smith: His Life, Thought and Legacy (Princeton University Press 
2016) 60). 
66  Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of 
David Hume and Adam Smith (CUP 1989) 136, 148-151. 
67 Ibid ch 7. 
68 Ibid 43, 153.   
69 For example, Dugald Stewart, who used much of the same terminology as Smith 
but to different effect, i.e. to the effect that moral qualities are immutable and 
objective, and that both justice and utility are ahistorical universal principles (Knud 
Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish 
Enlightenment (CUP 1996) ch 7). 
70  Christel Fricke, ‘Adam Smith: The Sympathetic Process and the Origin and 
Function of Conscience’ in Christopher J Berry et al, The Oxford Handbook of Adam 
Smith (OUP 2013) 20-22. 
71 Ibid. 
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historically specific systems of law, with temporally specific needs and demands, was 
the most that could be expected.72   
 Despite their differences, these accounts are, broadly speaking, unified in the 
way they allow critical distance from existing practices and values and leave room for 
the belief in ideals that transcend space and time without losing sight of the 
importance of particularity and change and without laying claim to absolute certainty. 
They can therefore facilitate the normative theorizing in all its forms, providing 
benchmarks (albeit imperfectly known ones) with which to undertake robust 
evaluation and orient reform efforts (always with the knowledge that wholesale 
reform is not possible). Furthermore, they do this while encouraging neither disdain 
for empiricism nor the threat of absolutism. What enables this combination of 
attention to context and commitment to the existence and enduring nature of values 
like justice or happiness is that it is through an examination of history that the ideals, 
in imperfectly realized form, are discernible. As Cotterrell has argued, this requires an 
examination of context: ‘it is not illegitimate to seek, in a text from an earlier 
historical time or written in a different culture, meanings that can transcend that time 
or culture; but those meanings are unlikely to be found unless context is taken 
seriously in interpreting the aims, meaning and scope of the text’.73 Likewise, as 
Lacey and Farmer point out, the contemporary space in which these ideals come to be 
discussed and potentially applied is characterized by its own peculiarities, which 
affect the palatability of the ideals and how they might plausibly be institutionalized. 
None of this is implies, however, that the theorist should be limited to producing, or 
articulating, normative principles that reflect or are shaped to fit the legal or political 
practices, values or institutions of her time and place.  
 Taken together, these observations suggest some answers to questions recently 
posed about the extent to which normative theorizing must attend to historical 
contingencies: ‘is it, modestly, a matter of seeing how such historical contingencies 
make a difference to the practical application and implications of a set of ahistorical, 
non-contingent, normative principles; or is it, more radically, a matter of grounding 
the normative principles themselves in particular historical settings?’74 The answers 
suggested are ‘neither’ and ‘these are not the only alternatives’. To the extent that 
normative theorizing is aimed at reform, it should of course pay attention to the ways 
in which institutional and political specificities influence the uptake of proposals. But 
in addition to offering lessons in how proposals might ‘take root’, an examination of 
history might also provide insight into what it is we should be trying to plant – the 
ideals embodied in the proposals. In this way, although the ideals will transcend space 
and time, they will not be ahistorical, at least insofar as this can be taken to imply 
disregard for history or indeed for the testimony of experience more generally.  
And when it comes to these ideals, the theorist cannot only be concerned with 
what is feasible because that would be to foreclose the possibility that any radically 
different order of things might come to obtain. Furthermore, outside of reform efforts, 
ideals have a regulative role to play in facilitating the robust evaluation and critique 
that are part of the full normative repertoire. This is why the suggestion that the 
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Law in History and Theory (n 1) 150. 
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normative principles be grounded in particular historical settings is also deficient, 
insofar as it can be interpreted as implying that the normative principles be grounded 
in the values and practices of the particular time and place in which the theorizing 
occurs. If these principles must be those of the theorists’ own time and place then the 
critical distance required for robust evaluation disappears. For this reason, normative 
theorizing must remain focussed on the possibility of transcending prevailing 
circumstances in both senses outlined at the start of this paper: bringing about an 
alternative set circumstances that are closer to an ideal, however imperfectly grasped 
and unclearly known, that extends beyond the peculiarities of time and place. This is 
why even though historical settings distinct from those in which normative theorizing 
occurs might provide insights into this, the normative principles that are expounded 
by the theorist will not be grounded in those historical settings either. They will be 
grounded in the belief that the ideal transcends these settings.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Under modern conditions, where transcendent meaning and immanent reality are 
often conceived of, and portrayed as, utterly divorced, the challenge we face is how to 
avoid ‘degrading immanent reality’ in favour of a ‘more perfect transcendent realm’, 
while nevertheless managing to avoid ‘denying the fact or implications of 
transcendence’.75 The search for transcendent meaning has not left us, and will not 
leave us. When we deny it, we are merely led to imbue something wholly immanent – 
current political or legal arrangements, for example – with transcendent meaning.76 
There is then a risk that these arrangements become prescriptive and even acquire the 
kind of peremptory force that traditional metaphysics ascribes to rational and logical 
deductions. Frequently, and problematically, the only alternative that is considered is 
some kind of transcendentalism that demands certainty and decries the relevance of 
history and experience.   
 This tendency to collapse into either immanence or transcendentalism across 
works of legal theory as well as legal history. For example, rational reconstruction, 
which occupies a central place within legal theory, is generally understood as the 
process of making sense of, and imposing order on, legal materials by interpreting 
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them in their best light. Yet despite this uncontentious definition, there are diverging 
views on what this requires. Displaying what I would describe as an immanent 
mindset, MacCormick saw the work of rational reconstruction as transforming legal 
material into a coherent and well-ordered whole and although he also ascribed moral 
and political judgments a central role in this process, 77 the moral and political values 
that steered this undertaking appear to be those prevailing at the time of 
reconstruction.78 Similarly, Cotterrell describes the task of jurisprudence as ‘making 
organised social regulation a valuable practice, rooted and effective in the specific 
contexts and historical conditions in which it exists but also aimed at serving demands 
for justice and security…as these perennial values are understood in their time and 
place’.79 What is crucial here is that the values of justice and security are conceived as 
particular to time and place and their contemporary interpretation is afforded priority: 
‘however wide these jurisprudential inquiries become, they start from and must relate 
back to conditions of legal practice and experience in their particular time and 
place’.80  
In contrast, for Priel the processes of articulating institutional practice and 
presenting it in its best light are bound together by the theorist’s overarching first-
order normative commitments. The theorist’s account of what makes law valuable, as 
determined through recourse to moral or political philosophy, drives the interpretive 
effort and many legal phenomena are eliminated in the process.81 These commitments 
must be related to the legal practice under consideration for the method to be 
considered interpretation in any true sense, but priority is afforded to the normative 
vision and a considerable amount of empirical inaccuracy is deemed acceptable.82 
This view is broadly shared by Victor Tadros, for whom the aims of rational 
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reconstruction are justifying and critiquing law’s institutional arrangements and 
political theory is the means for accomplishing these aims.83  
 These positions suffer from complementary difficulties: one focuses so 
intently on existing practices and values that it is incapable of moving past these and 
the other risks lapsing into irrelevance and dogmatism, depending on how moral and 
political philosophy are conceived (i.e. depending on the standard of certainty that is 
employed and whether they require a priori reasoning). The optimal position seems to 
be to adopt what I have described as an immanent-transcendent perspective by 
recognizing the necessity of strong evaluation, and the requirement for transcendent 
ideals that this entails, while acknowledging that these ideals are part of the world – 
part of a complete reality in which our mundane attempts to realize these ideals 
disclose something of their content as well as our ability to alter the world (albeit 
slowly and imperfectly) in accordance with them.84 An examination of ideals in the 
world also demonstrates the dangers of asserting them with absolute certainty, 
however: of homogenizing cultures, discouraging tolerance and hindering new ways 
of thinking. It therefore demands certain humility in normative theorizing.  
 This humility must be tempered by belief in the possibility of ideals with 
substantive content and meaning that transcend space and time and by preserving a 
role for the theorist in striving to articulate and advocate these. This requires fine-
grained contextual analysis that brings out the complex and deep meaning of concepts 
and practices at given points in history, but it also demands that an effort be made to 
extrapolate a sense of meaning that transcends these contexts. Understood like this, 
history is capable of providing a plurality of views while preserving a sense of 
enduring, aspirational, meaning in a way that other empirical disciplines, such as 
sociology, cannot.85 Close contextual analysis is also required to fully appreciate the 
contemporary arrangements that form the subject of critique, evaluation and reform, 
and this also demands a sophisticated grasp of history. Without this, it is impossible to 
recognize and fully understand fragments of older ideas and practices that have 
endured.86 Only when these two historically-informed endeavours come together can 
the strong evaluation that is needed to highlight deficiencies in existing practices and 
discourse and to make suggestions for improvement occur.  
 There is of course no need that these endeavours be undertaken 
simultaneously, though they might be undertaken by the same scholar. An example of 
this can be seen in the work of Norrie. In earlier work, Norrie concentrates on 
identifying and explaining the antinomies of contemporary ‘Kantian’ criminal justice 
thinking. This is of crucial importance (though greater historicism might alter the 
interpretation his offers87) but when these insights are directed towards explanatory 
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and immanent critique 88  only, they are incapable of moving beyond the law’s 
contemporary form and order. They are essential in ‘diagnosing’ the present, but they 
cannot be used to suggest radical change.89 In later work, however, Norrie embraces 
the transcendent mindset and begins to engage with what I have described as the full 
range of normative theorizing. As in previous work, Norrie employs a socio-historical 
method to characterize our contemporary condition, finding both value and ethical 
barrenness in modern liberalism. 90  This assessment of course depends on the 
existence of a relatively stable sense of good with which to undertake such an 
evaluation and it is here that history begins to play a different role. Underpinning 
Norrie’s assessment of liberalism is an interpretation of what humankind is like ‘in 
itself’ and ‘in its history’, i.e. comprised of beings with the potential to value freedom 
and solidarity, and with the capacity to negate existing states of affairs. 91  This 
conception of human nature emerges from instantiations of these capacities in history 
and from a philosophical anthropology that supports these capacities. 92 To be sure, 
the most radical and complete sense of freedom that is the ideal animating this 
account has never been realized within history but certain utopian moments – 
moments of revolutionary fervor – offer a glimpse of how we might transcend the 
present. 93 
 As the example of Norrie shows, it is possible for scholars to embrace 
different mindsets in the course of different projects. His example also shows that a 
transcendent mindset is essential to the full range of normative theorizing. In terms of 
what this transcendent mindset looks like, the shortcomings of understanding the 
world as decoupled from some transcendent realm suggests that it is advisable for 
scholars to aim for an integrated transcendent mindset, one that accepts the possibility 
of foundations that can transcend space and time and the possibility that lived history 
might offer insight into their nature. There is no escaping that these are unpopular 
notions, though, which defy the contemporary divide between empirical reality and a 
transcendent realm of meaning, and the priority that is commonly afforded to the 
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former.94 In light of this, the more ‘realistic’ lesson of this paper is that as long as 
scholars tend to work with this divide even implicitly in mind there will be a tendency 
to collapse scholarly inquiry into whichever mindset is favoured by the researcher. 
This has unavoidably negative consequences for any attempt to engage with, or 
critique, scholarship that is written by scholars on the other side of the divide or 
indeed scholarship that regards the divide as spurious. We should therefore not be 
surprised that Lacey and Ferzan end up talking past one another, even when they both 
rely on history: they are talking past one another from opposing sides of an 
unbreached divide.  
 Realizing this has implications for the way that any challenge to theory by 
history is framed. Recent scholarship has convincingly pointed towards some 
difficulties associated with normative theorizing when it is wholly inattentive to 
institutional and historical context. The problem is that by doing so in a way that 
encourages an immanent mindset, it forecloses the possibility of full normative 
engagement and leaves its critical targets unscathed. Perhaps more importantly, it 
risks undermining the value that history does and can hold for normative theorizing. If 
it is true that legal philosophy has been the dominant voice in normative legal theory, 
we should ask searching questions as to why this is so. To take an example from 
criminal law theory, Loughnan suggests that ‘their [legal-philosophical approaches] 
dominance has so far influenced the scholarly debate on criminal responsibility that 
the insights generated by socio-historical research tend to be, in effect if not by 
intention, pushed into a scholarly corner – as lacking weighty analytical purchase, or, 
because such assessment is interpretive rather than normative, of marginal 
significance or interest only’. 95  Could it be that historically-minded scholars are 
complicit in this marginalization? Socio-historical research that works to reduce the 
normative horizon runs up against the enduring need for transcendence that is a stable 
feature of the human experience. Its potency as a critique of a priori normative 
theorizing is therefore revealed to be overstated. At the same time, by casting this 
type of research as interpretive rather than normative, the possibility that history 
might fulfill different roles is occluded. Again, the path to remaining oriented towards 
transcendence and attentive to immanent concerns is blocked.  
At present, attempts to be both transcendentally minded and immanently 
grounded seem most often to result in either a retreat into the pursuit of disengaged, 
transcendent meaning or an equally myopic examination of the immanent world that 
closes off transcendence altogether. Whilst the preferred situation would be to adopt a 
more integrated immanent-transcendent perspective, this requires a degree of 
pliability – the ability to see the undeniably formative force of context without losing 
sight of the deeper senses of unity that run across space and time – that is difficult to 
attain, especially under modern conditions. Despite the difficulties, this should be the 
ambition of all scholars who are concerned with normative questions. Failing this, the 
very least that is required is an explicit awareness of one’s metaphysical commitments 
and a considered awareness of their full implications. This is an essential step to 
meaningful discussion – collaborative or critical – both in and across legal history and 
legal theory. 
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